Excerpts from Rusk-McNamara
Report to Kennedy, November 11, 1961.
l. United States National Interests in
South Viet-Nam.
The
deteriorating situation in South Viet-Nam requires attention to the nature and
scope of United States national interests in
that country. The loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism would involve the
transfer of a nation of 20 million people from the free world to the Communism
bloc. The loss of South Viet-Nam would make pointless any further discussion
about the importance of Southeast Asia to the free world; we would have to face
the near certainty that the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would move
to a complete accommodation with Communism, if not formal incorporation with
the Communist bloc. The United States, as a member of
SEATO, has commitments with respect to South Viet-Nam under the Protocol to the
SEATO Treaty. Additionally, in a formal statement at the conclusion session of
the 1954 Geneva Conference, the United States representative stated
that the United States "would view any
renewal of the aggression . . . with grave concern and seriously threatening
international peace and security."
The loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism would not only destroy SEATO but would
undermine the credibility of American commitments elsewhere. Further, loss of
South Viet-Nam would stimulate bitter domestic controversies in the United States and would be seized
upon by extreme elements to divide the country and harass the Administration...
3. The United States' Objective in South
Viet-Nam
The United States should commit itself
to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communist [sic].
The basic means for accomplishing this objective must be to put the Government
of South Viet-Nam into a position to win its own war against the Guerrillas. We
must insist that that Government itself take the measures necessary for that
purpose in exchange for large-scale United States assistance in the
military, economic and political fields. At the same time we must recognize
that it will probably not be possible for the GVN to win this war as long as
the flow of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam continues unchecked and the
guerrillas enjoy a safe sanctuary in neighboring territory.
We should be prepared to introduce United States combat forces if that
should become necessary for success. Dependent upon the circumstances, it may
also be necessary for United States forces to strike at
the source of the aggression in North Viet-Nam.
4. The Use of
United States Forces in South Viet-Nam.
The
commitment of United States forces to South
Viet-Nam involves two different catgories: (A) Units
of modest size required for the direct support of South Viet-Namese military effort, such as communications, helicopter
and other forms of airlift, reconnaissance aircraft, naval patrols,
intelligence units, etc., and (B) larger organized units with actual or
potential direct military mission. Category (A) should be introduced as
speedily as possible. Category (B) units pose a more serious problem in that
they are much more significant from the point of view of domestic and
international political factors and greatly increase the probabilities of
Communist bloc escalation. Further, the employment of United States combat forces (in the
absence of Communist bloc escalation) involves a certain dilemma: if there is a
strong South Viet Namese effort, they may not be
needed; if there is not such an effort, United States forces could not
accomplish their mission in the midst of an apathetic or hostile population.
Under present circumstances, therefore, the question of injecting United States and SEATO combat
forces should in large part be considered as a contribution to the morale of
the South Viet Namese in their own effort to do the
principal job themselves....
In the light
of the foregoing, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense recommend
that:
1. We now
take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall
of South Viet-Nam to Communism and that, in doing so,
we recognize that the introduction of United States and other SEATO
forces may be necessary to achieve this objective. (However, if it is necessary
to commit outside forces to achieve the foregoing objective, our decision to
introduce United States forces should not be
contingent upon unanimous SEATO agreement thereto.)
2. The
Department of Defense be prepared with plans for the
use of United States forces in South Viet Nam under one or more of
the following purposes:
(a) Use of a
significant number of United States forces to signify United States determination to
defend Viet-Nam and to boost South Viet-Nam morale.
(b) Use of
substantial United States forces to assist in
suppressing Viet Cong insurgency short of engaging in detailed
counter-guerrilla operations but including relevant operations in North
Viet-Nam.
(c) Use of United States forces to deal with
the situation if there is organized Communist military intervention.
3. We
immediately undertake the following actions in support of the GVN:
. . . (d)
Provide the GVN with small craft, including such United States uniformed advisers
and operating personnel as may be necessary for quick and effective operations
in effecting surveillance and control over coastal waters and inland
waterways....
(e) Provide such personnel and equipment as may be necessary to prove the
military-political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level and
extending upward through the Government and the armed forces to the Central
Intelligence Organization.
(f) Provide such new terms of reference, reorganization and additional
personnel for United States military forces as
are required for increased United States participation in the
direction and control of GVN military operations and to carry out the other
increased responsibilities which accrue to MAAG under these recommendations....
(i) Provide individual administrators and advisers
for insertion into the Governmental machinery of South VietNam in types and numbers
to be agreed upon by the two Governments....
SOURCE:
Sheehan and others (eds.), Pentagon
Papers, pp. 150-153.